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Asian financial cooperation as seen from Europe 
Gunter D Baer 
It is a great pleasure for me to attend this conference, jointly organised by Korea University 
and the BIS. We at the BIS have organised conferences with monetary institutions in the 
region, including the State Administration of Foreign Exchange in Beijing and the Bank of 
Thailand in Bangkok, but this is the first with an academic institution in the region. We take 
this opportunity to salute Korea University on its 100th anniversary and to wish it well in its 
next century. As Seoul aspires to become a hub for Northeast Asia, Korea’s world-class 
centres of learning will come into their own. 
We meet in this splendid academic environment to discuss a practical and topical subject. 
The work to be reported and commented on here is certainly of great relevance to a matter 
that is enjoying high priority on the agenda of Asian policymakers, namely promoting the 
development of Asian bond markets. 
In fact, I am convinced that steps to promote the Asian bond market have the potential to 
make a contribution to monetary and financial cooperation in Asia that goes beyond simply 
deepening and enhancing the efficiency of today’s bond markets. Let me explain what I have 
in mind by looking at Asian monetary cooperation through the European rear-view mirror. In 
doing so, I will first make some broad-brush comparisons between Asian and European 
developments and then present some observations on the forces that, in my mind, have 
driven the process of cooperation in Europe - leaving it to you to decide whether a similar 
development could be expected in Asia. 
At the risk of oversimplifying, there are at least two developments that are prompting closer 
monetary cooperation in Asia even as they did in Europe. The first is a marked increase in 
trade integration across the region, accompanied by the emergence of poles of economic 
growth independent of US demand and by a growing awareness of vulnerability to exchange 
rate changes. 
In Europe, this process was partly the result and partly the cause of closer monetary 
cooperation. And I am proud to say that the BIS, in offering technical and meeting-related 
support, played an important role in this process. Without going into detail, let me illustrate 
this with a couple of examples. Between 1950 and 1958 the European Payments Union used 
the BIS as an agent to permit the multilateralisation of bilateral surpluses and deficits in 
Europe, thus preparing the ground for a return to current account convertibility. In the Treaty 
of Rome of 1958 the European Community established the Monetary Committee, composed 
of very senior central bank and finance ministry officials. And in 1964 the European central 
banks set up the Committee of Governors as their central forum for cooperation. This 
Committee met for 30 years at the BIS - until a new European institution was established in 
Frankfurt. 
In Asia the response to growing regional integration broadly paralleled the European 
development. Regional central bank forums were launched, such as SEANZA (in 1957) and 
SEACEN (formally in 1982), to promote joint training and research. EMEAP started in 1991, 
operating first at Deputy Governor and later at Governor level, and soon established working 
groups in three financial areas of particular concern to central banks. In fact, these groups 
complemented those which had been in existence at the BIS for many years. 
The second common trend in the development of monetary cooperation in Asia and Europe 
was the impact of crises on the building of institutional arrangements. In Europe, the shock of 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the beginning of generalised floating 
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“snake”, supported by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), which settled 
intervention balances and provided short-term balance of payments support. Incidentally, this 
Fund existed more on paper - all operations were performed by the BIS acting as agent. Still, 
the record of these early efforts at monetary and exchange rate stability was pretty 
chequered, as inflation differentials necessitated parity changes and/or forced countries to 
opt out of the system. 
The shock of the foreign exchange and banking crisis in Asia in 1997-98 also initiated steps 
towards building firmer institutional structures - though not necessarily of the kind set up in 
Europe. The main strategy for building defences against currency crises was to increase the 
availability of reserves, either through swap lines as agreed by ASEAN+3 under the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, or simply by bolstering reserves as a kind of self-insurance. A different and, in 
its multilateral character, potentially far-reaching institutional measure was EMEAP’s 
launching last June of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) in dollar-denominated instruments, aimed 
at promoting the development of a regional bond market. It was recognised that a dollar-
denominated fund was the art of the possible rather than the desideratum. Accordingly, 
active discussions are now under way to add a second ABF in domestic currency. An 
extremely significant and multipronged approach to improving the underlying financial 
structure is being pursued in parallel by ASEAN+3. 
These developments in monetary cooperation pertain mainly to the past, with Asia lagging 
behind Europe, where such cooperation led in 1999 to the creation of a single currency and a 
common central bank. Naturally, this gives rise to the speculative question of whether 
developments in Asia will take the same turn, that is, follow the European path. Since we at 
the BIS do not speculate, I can neatly sidestep this question. However, having been closely 
involved for many years in the process of European monetary cooperation, I can highlight 
some of the forces that were instrumental in reaching the goal of monetary unification. Then I 
shall leave it to you to infer what this could mean for future monetary cooperation in Asia. 
Let me start with two more principal observations. The first is that the move towards 
monetary union in Europe was foremost a political process. Without the political will and 
impetus, monetary and financial integration at today’s level could not have happened. 
Having said this, my second principal observation is that the political objective of monetary 
union would also not have been achieved without the active part played by the financial 
authorities and, in particular, the central banks. Just to remind you, the breakthrough in 
moving to monetary union was based on a blueprint of how to realise monetary union (the 
Delors Report of 1989) presented by a group of central bank Governors. 
But, in addition to these points, I would identify at least three lessons to be drawn from the 
process of monetary cooperation in Europe. 
First, financing arrangements such as short-term swaps or medium-term balance of 
payments loans (as granted by the EMCF and the European Community during the first 
phase of the exchange rate mechanism) have frequently been cited as an important 
prerequisite for the success of the exchange rate arrangements. I doubt that their 
contribution in terms of providing financial resources was really decisive, but I recognise that 
these mechanisms were sometimes of enormous psychological and tactical importance for 
coming to an agreement in the negotiations. 
Second, institutional aspects matter. European experience, however, suggests that big 
institutional structures are not necessary for success - at least not until the moment that 
responsibility for policy is transferred to a new, common institution. In fact, the process of 
European central bank cooperation relied for decades on a very small permanent secretariat, 
working independently under the roof of the BIS. 
Third, there is nothing better than an operational framework to promote and focus monetary 
cooperation. Such a framework could be a swap arrangement requiring accounting and 
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matters is that any such arrangement makes it necessary to meet, to exchange views and to 
take decisions in common. This in turn builds knowledge and mutual trust, which provide the 
basis for getting through difficult moments in more ambitious cooperative undertakings. 
Let me conclude with these observations and, as I said earlier, I leave it to you to judge to 
what extent they are relevant for the process of Asian monetary cooperation. In one respect, 
however, I am certain the discussions held here between researchers and policymakers form 
part of the grand tradition of promoting monetary cooperation. On that note, I wish you all a 
challenging and fruitful exchange of views at this conference. 